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WILLIAMS v. GARCETTI: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEFECTS IN CALIFORNIA'S "GANG-PARENT"
LIABILITY STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of the California Supreme Court's decision in Wil-
liams v. Garcetti,' parents are now subject to arrest for bad parent-
ing-"or at least parenting so dismal that a 'reasonable person' ...
would have known that the child was in danger of becoming delin-
quent."2 In this case, the California Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the 1988 amendment to California Penal Code section
272, 3 which provides that "a parent or legal guardian to any person
under the age of 18 years shall have the duty to exercise reasonable
care, supervision, protection, and control over their minor child."4
This statute holds parents or guardians who commit any act or omit
any duty causing, encouraging, or contributing to the delinquency of a
minor guilty of a misdemeanor.5
This Note briefly discusses the background of the Amendment.6
It then examines the Williams v. Garcetti decision7 and the California
Supreme Court's analysis of the constitutional issues.8 Next, this Note
describes how the court incorrectly applied the overbreadth doctrine 9
to a case involving the right of privacy, 10 and did not apply the analy-
1. 5 Cal. 4th 561, 853 P.2d 507, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341 (1993).
2. William W. Bedsworth, Throwing the Book at Mom and Dad, L.A. TiMEs, Aug. 23,
1993, at B7.
3. This Note refers to the 1988 amendment to § 272 as "the Amendment."
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
5. Id.
6. See infra part II.A.
7. See infra part II.B.
8. See infra part III.
9. The overbreadth doctrine is applied to cases involving First Amendment violations
because of "a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expres-
sion." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973); see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). "Because of the
importance of the free speech guarantee, even when the state does have the power to
regulate an area, it 'must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to
infringe the protected freedom."' JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSnTu-
TIONAL LAW § 16.8, at 944 (4th ed. 1991) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
304 (1940)).
10. The right of privacy has been defined as "the right to be let alone-the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United
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ses prescribed by the United States Supreme Court for substantive
due process and equal protection cases.'1 This Note then analyzes the
Amendment under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,
using the strict scrutiny review that the court should have applied in
order to invalidate the statute. Finally, this Note discusses policy rea-
sons against the Amendment, the deficiencies of parental liability stat-
utes, and the statute's inability to serve its intended purpose of
controlling street gang activity.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History of the 1988 Amendment to California Penal
Code Section 272
Penal Code section 27212 was amended in 1988 as part of the Cal-
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The United States Supreme
Court explained the right of privacy in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court held
that although it is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution,
the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of cer-
tain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying con-
texts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that
right in the first Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); in the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968), Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886),
see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. [479],
484-485 [(1965)]; in the Ninth Amendment, id., at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring);
or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923).... They also make
it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541-542 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. [438], at 453-454
[(1972)]; id, at 460,463-465 (White, J., concurring in result); family relationships,
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,166 (1944); and child rearing and education,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), Meyer, [262 U.S. at 399].
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
11. Courts usually apply a rational basis standard of review for liberties protected by
the Constitution. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961), Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). In such cases, a statute will only be invalidated if "the
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objec-
tive." McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425.
However, "[w]hen a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of
a fundamental right, [the statute] cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently
important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests."
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978); see Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56; Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972);
Carl Cheng, Comment, Important Rights and the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 73
CAL. L. REv. 1929,1935 (1985); Roberta L. Steele, Note, All Things Not Being Equal: The
Case for Race Separate Schools, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 591, 591 (1993).
12. Prior to its amendment, this section provided that
[e]very person who commits any act or omits the performance of any duty, which
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ifornia Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP
Act),13 which was enacted in an effort to control violent criminal
street gang activity. 14 However, unlike the STEP Act, the Amend-
ment is not specifically aimed at controlling juvenile gang activity;
rather, it is targeted at the parents of juvenile delinquents. In addition
to amending section 272, the California Legislature also added chap-
ter 2.9B to the Penal Code, entitled "Parental Diversion."'- This pro-
gram is intended for parents charged with "contributing to the
delinquency" of their child pursuant to the Amendment.'6 Under the
parental diversion program, parents or guardians accused of violating
section 272 may seek education and rehabilitation services; resulting
in the dismissal of charges upon satisfactory completion of the pro-
gram.' 7 The Los Angeles District Attorney's Office has developed
procedures in order to determine whether a parent's behavior consti-
act or omission causes or tends to cause or encourage any person under the age of
18 years to come within the provisions of Sections 300, 601, or 602 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code or which act or omission contributes thereto.., is guilty of
a misdemeanor ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1988).
Under California law, a minor may be adjudged a dependent child of the juvenile
court if the minor has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the minor will suffer,
among other things: (1) serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by the parent or
guardian; (2) serious physical harm or illness as a result of the parent's or guardian's failure
or inability to supervise adequately or protect the minor, or to provide the minor with
adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or to provide regular care for the
minor due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or sub-
stance abuse; (3) serious emotional damage; (4) or sexual abuse. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 300 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994).
Additionally, Welfare and Institutions Code § 601 provides that a minor may be deter-
mined to be a ward of the juvenile court if the minor persistently or habitually disobeys
parents or ordinances, or if the minor is a habitual truant. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601
(West 1994).
Finally, any minor who violates any state or federal law or any local criminal ordi-
nance other than a curfew based solely on age is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court and may be determined to be a ward of the court. Id. § 602.
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.20 (West Supp. 1994).
14. The STEP Act includes measures which establish criminal penalties for gang partic-
ipation and its attendant criminal activities, and provides sentence enhancements for felo-
nies committed "for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal
street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by
gang members." Id. § 186.22. The STEP Act also defines certain buildings and places
where gang activities are construed as nuisances subject to injunction, abatement, or dam-
ages. Id. § 186.22(b)(1).
15. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1001.70-.75 (West Supp. 1994).
16. Section 272 is entitled "Causing, encouraging or contributing to delinquency of per-
sons under 18 years; inducing disobedience to court order; punishment." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 272 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1001.70-.75.
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tutes a violation of the Amendment, 8 and whether a parent will be
prosecuted, directed to the parenting program, or released for lack of
sufficient evidence.' 9
B. The Facts and Procedural Background of Williams v. Garcetti
Plaintiffs, as taxpayers, filed their original complaint on July 20,
1989 for injunctive and declaratory relief to halt the enforcement of
the Amendment." They claimed that enforcement of the Amend-
ment would constitute a waste of public funds.2' The trial court
18. The Referral Guidelines portion of the City Attorney Parenting Program Proce-
dures (CAPP) states that
While no factor will singularly determine whether a case should be accepted, each
of the following criteria should be considered in any case presented for hearing or
prosecution.
1. A detailed description of the acts or circumstances which brought the ju-
venile within Sections 300, 601, or 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code
(Although final adjudication of juvenile proceedings is not a requirement for a
filing against the parent); and any available documentation of the juvenile pro-
ceedings, such as arrest reports, cite backs, parental profiles and interviews should
be included in the case file;
2. A detailed description of the acts or omissions of duty on the part of the
parent which caused or encouraged the juvenile to come within the above provi-
sions;
3. The number and type of warnings given to the parent and by whom;
4. Whether any parenting programs have been offered to the parents;
5. The statements and attitude of parents and the juvenile during the investi-
gation; or cite-back (every effort should be made to thoroughly interview parents
concerning the delinquency problem and their efforts to correct it. Miranda
warnings should be given when appropriate.);
6. The parents' inability to supervise and control the offending juvenile (dis-
cuss whether there are any circumstances beyond the control of the parent that
may contribute to an inability to effectively supervise and control);
7. The experience and training of officers or others involved in the investiga-
tion or cite-back;
8. Neighborhood complaints or other corroboration of the problem with the
juvenile and/or the parents.
All filing decisions will be made on a case by case basis.
L.A. CrrY ArroRNEY, CrrY ArroRNEY PARENTING PROGRAM 4-5 (Mar. 1993).
19. Id.
20. Williams v. Reiner, 13 Cal. App. 4th 392,399,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472,474 (1991), rev'd
sub nom. Williams v. Garcetti, 5 Cal. 4th 561, 853 P.2d 507, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341 (1993).
Hereinafter, Williams v. Reiner will be referred to as Williams I, Williams v. Garcetti will be
referred to as Williams II.
21. Williams I, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 398, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473. The pertinent part of
California's Code of Civil Procedure reads:
An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expendi-
ture of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a county,
town, city or city and county of the state, may be maintained against any officer
thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a citizen
resident therein, or by a corporation, who ... has paid, a tax therein.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 526a (West 1979).
[Vol. 28:447
"GANG-PARENT" LIABILITY
granted summary judgment to defendants' Ira Reiner and James K.
Hahn on the basis that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
amendment. The court also determined the Amendment to be
neither vague nor overbroadP3 Plaintiffs filed a first amended com-
plaint on December 21, 1989, reinstating their allegations that the
Amendment was impermissibly vague, as it failed to provide fair and
adequate notice of the parental conduct that it prohibited.- 4 Plaintiffs
also alleged that the statute was overbroad, thereby violating a par-
ent's fundamental liberty interest in the rearing of children under both
federal and state constitutions.35 Finally, plaintiffs contended that the
statute violated a parent's right to privacy under both federal and
state constitutions.2 6
The California Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, and re-
manded the matter to the trial court, which was ordered to enter sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiffs. The appellate court first ruled that
plaintiffs had standing as taxpayers,27 and then held that the Amend-
ment was impermissibly vague and therefore unconstitutional, never
reaching the issues of overbreadth or impingement of the parents'
right to privacy.28
On appeal, the California Supreme Court addressed only the is-
sues of vagueness and overbreadth. The court concluded that the
Amendment was neither vague nor overbroad so as to violate the Cal-
ifornia and federal constitutions and therefore reversed the judgment
of the court of appeal. 29
22. The lawsuit was originally filed as Williams v. Reiner, 13 Cal. App. 4th 392,2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 472 (1991). James K. Hahn was the Los Angeles City Attorney and Ira Reiner
was the Los Angeles County District Attorney. Gilbert Garcetti succeeded Ira Reiner as
the Los Angeles County District Attorney.
23. Williams 11, 5 Cal. 4th at 567, 853 P.2d at 509, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343.
24. Williams 1, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 400, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id at 407, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479-80. Under California law, plaintiffs who reside
within the city or county of Los Angeles have standing to sue as taxpayers. CAL. Civ.
PRoc. CODE § 526a; see supra note 21 for the text of § 526a.
28. Williams 1, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 407-08, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 480. The court stated that
"in view of our holding, we do not reach the plaintiffs' remaining contention that the
amendment is unconstitutionally overbroad." Id at 420,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 488. The court
also failed to reach the privacy issue, as plaintiffs did not raise this issue on appeal. Wil-
liams II, 5 Cal. 4th 561, 567 n.3, 853 P.2d 507, 509 n.3, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 343 n.3.
29. Williams II, 5 Cal. 4th at 579, 853 P.2d at 517, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 351.
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III. THE CALFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS
A. Vagueness
The starting point of the court's analysis was "'the strong pre-
sumption that legislative enactments "must be upheld unless their un-
constitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears ...
[They] cannot be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and prac-
tical construction can be given to [their] language." ' "I' The court
then evaluated the specificity of the Amendment under the standards
prescribed by the United States .,Supreme Court for determining
whether a statute'is void for vagueness.31 First, a criminal statute must
"'be definite enough to provide (1) a standard of conduct for those
whose activities are proscribed and (2) a standard for police enforce-
ment and for ascertainment of guilt.' "12 If a statute meets both of
these criteria, courts will consider it sufficiently specific to meet the
due process33 requirement.
1. Notice
In determining whether the Amendment provides sufficient no-
tice to a parent, the court confined its "analysis to section 272 as ap-
plied to juvenile delinquency through Welfare and Institutions Code
sections 601[] and 602,[F5] and to the 'supervision' and 'control' ele-
ments of the duty identified in the [A]mendment. '36 The court rea-
soned that the pre-amendment language of section 272 imposes
criminal liability on any person whose act or omission causes or en-
30. Williams II, 5 Cal. 4th at 568, 853 P.2d at 509, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343 (quoting
Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 143, 763 P.2d 852, 872, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 21-22
(1988) (citation omitted in original)).
31. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,357-58 (1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S 104, 108-09 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165-66
(1972); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617-18 (1954).
32. Williams H1, 5 Cal. 4th at 567, 853 P.2d at 509, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343 (quoting
Walker, 47 Cal. 3d 112,141,763 P.2d 852,871,253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 20). See also Kolender, 461
U.S. at 358 (holding that statute requiring "credible and reliable" identification to peace
officer by persons loitering or wandering on streets is unconstitutionally vague on its face).
33. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; Michael D. Fricklas, Note, Executive Order
12,356: The First Amendment Rights of Government Grantees, 64 B.U. L. Rnv. 447, 508
(1984).
34. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West 1984).
35. Id. § 602.
36. Williams 11, 5 Cal. 4th at 570, 853 P.2d at 511, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 345. Welfare and
Institutions Code § 300 contains a long list of conditions under which a minor can be re-




courages the child to engage in delinquent acts, and that implicit in
this language is the duty to make a reasonable effort to prevent the
child from so doing.37 The breach of this duty results in a violation of
the Amendment.3" The court determined that the Amendment states
more definitively that a parent violates the statute upon failing to ex-
ercise reasonable supervision or control over the child where that
omission results in the child's delinquency.39
Plaintiffs alleged that this duty of reasonable "supervision" or
"control" is vague because it provides no guidance or explanation to
parents as to what constitutes "reasonable duty."40 However, the
cburt resolved that the Legislature meant to incorporate the tradi-
tional definition of supervision and control from California tort law,41
and did not intend to create a new duty for parents.42 Therefore, the
court adopted the terms supervision and control in the Amendment as
defined in the law of torts.43 In this Way, the court was able to cure
the alleged vagueness of the statute.
The court stated that even though neither the statute nor case law
clearly indicates to parents what constitutes reasonable supervision
and control, the duty is sufficiently certain to pass constitutional mus-
37. Williams II, 5 Cal. 4th at 571, 853 P.2d at 511, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 345-46.
38. Id.
39. Id., 853 P.2d at 512, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346.
40. Plaintiffs/Appellants' Brief on the Merits at 17-18, Williams II, 5 Cal. 4th 561, 853
P.2d 507, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341 (1993) (No. S024925) [hereinafter Plaintiffs/Appellants'
Brief]. To illustrate the vagueness of this "reasonable" standard, plaintiffs asked:
[D]oes a single parent who is forced by economics to work two jobs or live in an
area where gang activity is pervasive fail to exercise reasonable care and supervi-
sion if their child then becomes involved in a gang, even when that involvement is
only as the friend of a gang member? To avoid these elements, must this parent
refuse to let their child play outside in a drug and gang-infested neighborhood?
... The answers to these questions are not discernable from the statute for the
ordinary person.
Id. at 19-20.
41. California follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which places upon the parent
a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor child as to prevent it
from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to
know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of
the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 316 (1965).
42. Williams II, 5 Cal. 4th at 572, 853 P.2d at 512, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346.
43. Id. The California Court of Appeal, on the other hand, had refused to "judicially
criminalize a civil statute by applying the parental tort liability standard to section 272.
Section 272 makes no reference to the civil laws and evinces no intent to import such a
standard into a criminal statute." Williams 1, 13 Cal. App. 4th 392,420,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472,
488 (1991). The court stated that "[t]he record contains no evidence to support a finding
that the Legislature intended or-even considered whether it should apply the civil tort
liability standard to section 272." Id
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ter. 4 In addition, "'[t]here is no formula for the determination of
reasonableness.'' Yet standards of this kind are not impermissibly
vague, provided their meaning can be objectively ascertained by refer-
ence to common experiences of mankind."4 Furthermore, the court
indicated that parents are only held liable if they are criminally negli-
gent in breaching their duty of supervision and control. 6
In addressing plaintiffs' concern that the statute punishes parents
who try but are unable to control their children, the court stated that a
parent who makes reasonable efforts to comply with the statute, but
who is unable to do so, would not be guilty of breaching the duty of
control.47 The criminal negligence standard provides that the defend-
ant's conduct must be "gross"-a greater breach of duty than is neces-
sary for ordinary negligence.48 Therefore, according to the court,
breach of this duty due to ordinary negligence will not subject parents
to criminal liability under the Amendment. Parents can be convicted
only for gross or extreme departures from the objectively reasonable
standard of care.49
2. Enforcement
The court began the second part of its vagueness inquiry50 by cit-
ing Kolender v. Lawson,51 reiterating that
we have recognized recently that the more important aspect
of the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other
principal element of the doctrine-the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law en-
forcement." Where the legislature fails to provide such mini-
mal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a standardless
44. See Williams I, 5 Cal. 4th at 572, 853 P.2d at 512-13, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346-47.
45. Id. at 573, 853 P.2d at 513, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347 (quoting People v. Daniels, 71
Cal. 2d 1119, 1129, 459 P.2d 225, 231, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 903 (1969) (quoting Go-Bart Im-
porting Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931))).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 575, 853 P.2d at 514, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348.
48. The court has defined criminal negligence as" 'aggravated, culpable, gross, or reck-
less, that is, ... such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent
or careful [person] under the same circumstances as to [demonstrate] ... an indifference to
consequences.'" lId at 574, 853 P.2d at 513, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347 (quoting People v.
Penny, 44 Cal. 2d 861, 879, 285 P.2d 926, 937 (1955)).
The court goes even further by stating that parents will not be held criminally negli-
gent without actual or constructive knowledge that their child is at risk of delinquency. Id.,
853 P.2d at 514, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348.
49. Id. at 575, 853 P.2d at 514, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348.
50. Id., 853 P.2d at 515, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349.
51. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
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sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to
pursue their personal predilections.""2
The California Supreme Court further distinguished the statute in
Kolender from the Amendment by reasoning that the Amendment
"does not vest 'virtually complete discretion' in law enforcement offi-
cials."53 Rather, the preexisting definition incorporated from tort law
gives sufficient guidance to police, prosecutors, and juries so as to
minimize arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. 4
Moreover, the court found that the Amendment's requirement of
a causal link between the parent's breach of duty and the child's delin-
quency reduced the likelihood of arbitrary or discriminatory enforce-
ment.55 Although it can be difficult to determine whether the parent's
criminal negligence actually "causes or tends to cause or encourage" 56
the child's delinquency, the court noted that this question has not
been unduly troublesome in tort liability, and therefore will not prove
to be so in the criminal context.5 7
In conclusion, the court determined that the Amendment did not
fail to provide a minimal standard for enforcement. 8 Therefore, the
court of appeal's decision that the statute was void for vagueness59
was overruled.
B. Overbreadth
The court next considered plaintiffs' contention that the Amend-
ment was overbroad on its face, thereby infringing on the right of inti-
mate family association' as protected by both federal and state
constitutions.6 1 The court acknowledged the significance of this right
to "be let alone by the government in 'the private realm of family
52. Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574-75 (1974)).
53. Williams II, 5 Cal. 4th at 576, 853 P.2d at 515, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
57. Williams II, 5 Cal. 4th at 576, 853 P2d at 515, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349.
58. Id. at 577, 853 P.2d at 515, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349.
59. Williams 1, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 420,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 488. The court of appeal held
that "[t]he amendment is impermissibly vague .... [It] leaves much room for abuse and
mischief in its enforcement because any law enforcement agency is free to decide, based on
purely subjective factors, whether the parents exercised reasonable control and supervision
over their child." Id. at 412, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 483.
60. The right of intimate association involves "certain kinds of highly personal relation-
ships." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). The relationships af-
forded constitutional protection are those involving marriage, childbirth, raising and
educating children, and cohabitation with relatives. Id. at 619.
61. Williams II, 5 Cal. 4th at 577, 853 P.2d at 516, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350.
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life,' "62 but emphasized that a facial challenge of overbreadth is diffi-
cult to sustain.63 The court then launched into a dissertation on First
Amendment cases' in order to support its statement that overbreadth
is a difficult doctrine to prove.65 The court concluded that "[a]lthough
the right of intimate family association is constitutionally protected, a
statute that seeks to regulate parental behavior is not overbroad per
se."966 Furthermore, in order for a statute to be overbroad per se, the
plaintiffs would need to "show that 'a substantial number of instances
exist in which the [amendment as construed] cannot be applied consti-




1. Expressive versus intimate association
The California Supreme Court incorrectly applied the over-
breadth doctrine69 to a case that did not involve the First Amendment.
62. Id. (quoting City of Cannel-by-the-Sea v. YOung, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 266-67, 466 P.2d
225, 230, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1970)).
63. Id.
64. The First Amendment protects the right of expressive association, while intimate
family association is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Rob-
erts, 468 U.S. at 617-18. See Barbara Jones, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 6
CORNELL L. RIv. 1187, 1197 n.50 (1993); Daniel L. Schwartz, Comment, Discrimination
on Campus: A Critical Examination of Single-Sex College Social Organizations, 75 CAL. L.
REv. 2117,2140 (1987); Marian L. Zobler, Note, When is a Private Club not a Private Club:
The Scope of the Rights of Private Clubs after New York State Club Association v. City of
New York, 55 BROOK. L. Rnv. 327, 354 (1989); infra part IV.A.1.
65. The court described New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1
(1988), where the United States Supreme Court refused to strike down a statute that alleg-
edly violated the plaintiff's freedom of expressive association, protected by the First
Amendment. Williams II, 5 Cal. 4th at 578, 853 P.2d at 516, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350.
66. Williams 11, 5 Cal. 4th at 578, 853 P.2d at 516,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350. Although the
amendment to § 272 was held to be constitutional on its face, the court did not rule out the
possibility that it may be unconstitutional as applied, stating that "whatever overbreadth
may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its
sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied." Id., 853 P.2d at 517, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 351
(quoting New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 14 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973))).
67. Id., 853 P.2d at 517, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 351 (quoting New York State Club Ass'n,
487 U.S. at 14).
68. Id.
69. The overbreadth doctrine is a Frst Amendment doctrine that deals with laws that
restrict speech activity. It may be used when "(1) the protected activity is a significant part
of the law's target, and (2) there exists no satisfactory way of severing the law's constitu-
tional from its unconstitutional applications so as to excise the latter clearly in a single step
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Plaintiffs alleged a violation of a parent's freedom of intimate family
association,7 1 which is protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.71 They did not allege a violation of a par-
ent's freedom of expressive association, 72 which is protected by the
First Amendment. 73 According to the United States Supreme Court,
[o]ur decisions have referred to constitutionally protected
"freedom of association" in two distinct senses. In one line
of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must
be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of
the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual
freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this
respect, freedom of association receives protection as a funda-
mental element of personal liberty. In another set of deci-
sions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment-speech, assembly, petition...74
The United States Supreme Court thus requires that statutes imping-
ing upon the fundamental liberty of intimate association be subject to
a strict scrutiny review. 75 Statutes impinging upon one's freedom of
expressive association-as protected by the First Amendment-are
subject to a different, yet still strict, standard of review76 that may in-
from the law's reach." LAURENCE H. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-27, at
1022 (2d ed. 1988).
70. Williams II, 5 Cal. 4th at 577, 853 P.2d at 516, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350.
71. This type of freedom to associate is "protected by the cbncept of liberty in the due
process clauses and as an implicit part of the Bill of Rights guarantees; this right is con-
nected to the fundamental right to privacy." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 16.41,
at 1063.
72. See Plaintiffs/Appellants' Brief, supra note 40, at 41-45.
73. Expressive association involves "the freedom of individuals to associate for the
purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities." Board of Directors of
Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987).
74. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.'609, 617-18(1984) (emphasis added); see
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545.
75. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-06 (1977). The Moore
Court held that a family's right of intimate association was impinged upon by a housing
ordinance that defined "family" narrowly, so as to preclude a grandmother from living in
the same home as her son and her two grandsons. Id.
76. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court stated that
[i]f this were a case involving government action claimed to violate the First
Amendment guarantee of free speech, a finding of "overreaching" would be sig-
nificant and might be crucial. For when otherwise valid governmental regulation
sweeps so broadly as to impinge upon activity protected by the First Amendment,
its very overbreadth may make it unconstitutional.
Id. at 484.
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clude a rigorous test of vagueness and overbreadth.77
The California Supreme Court should have applied strict scrutiny
analysis to the Amendment. It is no accident that all of the cases re-
ferred to in the "overbreadth" part of the court's opinion involved
alleged violations of the First Amendment freedom of association.78
Although "[tlhe intrinsic and instrumental features of [the two dis-
tinct] constitutionally protected association[s] may... coincide ... ,,
in this case they do not. There is no indication that implementation of
the Amendment violates a parent's freedom of expressive associa-
tion.80 Therefore, any overbreadth analysis of the Amendment is ex-
traneous and inconclusive as to its constitutional validity.
2. Plaintiffs should have argued a violation of the right to raise
children without government interference, not of the right
of intimate association
Although plaintiffs alleged a violation of a family's right of inti-
mate association,8 ' this is not the liberty upon which the Amendment
actually impinges.' Section 272 does not involve freedom of intimate
association because it does not interfere with "the right of an individ-
ual to choose with whom to be intimate. '8 3 The Amendment does not
prevent parents from maintaining personal and private relationships
with their children. Nor does the Amendment compel the govern-
ment to intrude on choices concerning family living arrangements.8 4
The right of intimate association is not synonymous with the parental
right of child rearing, even though they are both commonly connected
77. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 16.8, at 944; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Mak-
ing Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE LI. 853, 904 (1991).
78. These cases include: New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1
(1988) (upholding constitutionality of state law which exempts benevolent orders and reli-
gious corporations from antidiscrimination provision); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601 (1973) (holding that state regulation of political activities is constitutional because law
is not substantially overbroad); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) (involving right
of NAACP to associate for purpose of "collective advocacy of ideas.") Id. at 309.
79. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
80. Freedom of expressive association involves the "right to associate for the purpose
of engaging in types of activity expressly protected by the first amendment." NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 16.41, at 1063; see TRIBE, supra note 69, § 12-26, at 1013; see,
e.g., Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987);
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609.
81. Plaintiffs/Appellants' Brief, supra note 40, at 41.
82. Intimate association, which is "a fundamental right connected to the concept of
privacy[,] includes the freedom to choose one's spouse and to maintain a relationship with
members of one's family." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 16.41, at 1063.
83. Zobler, supra note 64, at 329.
84. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
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to the right of privacy.85 Therefore, plaintiffs should not have asserted
that the Amendment violates their right to intimate association;
8 6
rather, the liberty at issue is a parent's right to raise children without
government interference.'
Plaintiffs included an extensive discussion of this liberty in their
argument that the statute is overbroad,88 and correctly noted that the
Amendment impinges upon the parental right to rear one's children
without the state's intervention.8 9 However, this analysis is relevant
to substantive due process,90 not to overbreadth.91
A substantive due process test places a considerably greater bur-
den on a state than one of overbreadth.92 In a facial overbreadth chal-
lenge,93 the plaintiffs are required to prove that a law substantially
interferes with their constitutionally protected speech.94 The state
must then show that the statute's interference with protected speech is
85. See TRIBE, supra note 69, § 15-20, at 1414-17.
86. Plaintiffs/Appellants' Brief, supra note 40, at 41-45.
87. The United States Supreme Court has "long recognized that freedom of personal
choice in matters of... family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,
639-40 (1974); see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (noting "historic
respect... [and] sanctity... traditionally accorded to [family] relationships"); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972) (reaffirming liberty interest of parents to raise and
educate their children without undue government interference); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (noting that "constitutional interpretation has consistently recog-
nized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our society"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (recognizing "the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (stating that "we think it
entirely plain that the [statute] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing ... of children under their control"); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (holding invalid state law which prohibited teaching for-
eign languages to children as "interfer[ing] with.., the power of parents to control the
education of their own"); see also Kathryn J. Parsley, Note, Constitutional Limitations on
State Power to Hold Parents Criminally Liable for the Delinquent Acts of Their Children, 44
V"D. L. Rnv. 441, 460 (1991) (discussing constitutional problems presented by state pa-
rental liability statutes).
88. Plaintiffs/Appellants' Brief, supra note 40, at 43-45.
89. Id. at 44.
90. See infra part IV.B.1 for an impingement analysis.
91. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
92. See TRIBE, supra note 69, § 12-28, at 1024-25.
93. "A plausible challenge to a law as void for overbreadth can be made only when (1)
the protected activity is a significant part of the law's target; and (2) there exists no satisfac-
tory way of severing the law's constitutional from its unconstitutional applications so as to
excise the latter clearly in a single step from the law's reach." TRIBE, supra note 69, § 12-
27, at 1022.
94. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
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"insubstantial when compared with the law's legitimate applications."95
Therefore, the state need not prove that the statute is the least bur-
densome means available to achieve its goals, as is required by a sub-
stantive due process analysis.
96
However, in a due process challenge involving a fundamental
fight, the state is put to a significantly more difficult task-the state is
required to prove that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a com-
pelling interest.97 The state must fulfill its obligation of showing that
less burdensome alternatives to its chosen method would not achieve
its objective.98 Therefore, because the California Supreme Court mis-
takenly applied an overbreadth analysis to the Amendment,99 the
state never had to show that the Amendment fulfilled its purpose of
deterring street gang activity."° California was thus relieved of the
heavy burden that states must meet before they are permitted to in-
fringe on fundamental fights. -
B. Substantive Due Process Analysis
Under the United States Constitution, the state and federal gov-
ernments may not deprive a citizen of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.1 1 Citizens are afforded both procedural and sub-
stantive'0 2 protections from government interference. Although most
statutes are upheld under a rational basis standard of review,10 3 those
that interfere with fundamental liberties must pass the Supreme
Court's strict scrutiny testY"4 Therefore, because the parental fight to
raise children without government interference is a fundamental
right,10 5 any statute that impinges on this fight is subject to strict scru-
tiny."° Accordingly, the Amendment should have been analyzed
under the two prongs of this test: (1) the state's objective must be
compelling; and (2) the state's objective must be narrowly tailored to
95. TRIBE, supra note 69, § 12-28, at 1025.
96. See id.
97. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
98. See infra part IV.B.3.
99. See supra part IILB.
100. See infra part IV.B for a substantive due process analysis.
101. U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
102. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
103. TRIBE, supra note 69, § 16-2, at 1440-41; see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
104. TRIBE, supra note 69, § 16-7, at 1454.
105. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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achieve that objective.1' 7
1. Impingement
The threshold question in a due process analysis of a fundamental
right is whether the law at issue impinges upon the right.'08 In this
case, the Amendment does impinge upon a parent's fundamental right
to child rearing, thus triggering strict scrutiny review.'0 9 The law im-
pinges on parental rights by adding a burden on parents heavier than
that already created by the law of torts." 0 The California Supreme
Court believed that it was not imposing a new duty on parents when it
incorporated the common-law tort standard into the penal code's re-
quirement of "reasonable care, supervision, protection, and con-
trol.""' However, the court's decision does place a considerable
additional burden on parents already subject to the common law of
California.
As a result of the Amendment, parents are not only civilly liable
for the acts of their children, but are now also subject to criminal pros-
ecution." 2 In addition, although the civil tort only comes into play if
an injured person sues the parent, parents are always subject to a pen-
alty under the criminal statute. For example, parents are liable under
the Amendment regardless of whether their children actually cause
injury to another person, while the civil tort requires children to either
intentionally harm or create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to
another." 3 Furthermore, parents may be liable under the Amend-
ment if their children are adjudged to be delinquent or truant,"4 while
107. See Toni Weinstein, Comment, Visiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The
Legality of Criminal Parental Liability Statutes, 64 S., CAL. L. REv. 859, 873 (1991); supra
note 11 and accompanying text.
108. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980) ("[lit is well settled that ... if a law
'impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution [it]
is presumptively unconstitutional.' ") (quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980));
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,640 (1974) ("ITihe Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires that such rules must not needlessly, arbitrarily, or
capriciously impinge upon [a] constitutional liberty.").
109. If a court finds that a fundamental right is not unduly impinged upon, then it will
only apply a rational basis review, merely requiring the legislation to be rationally related
to a legitimate governmental purpose. Harris, 448 U.S. at 326; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978); see TRmE, supra note 69, § 15-2, at 1306-08.
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965) (discussing parents' duty to
control conduct of child).
111. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); see supra part III.A.1.
112. CAL PENAL CODE § 272.
113. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
114. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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this requirement does not exist under the civil law.
Indigent parents, who were previously unaffected by the tort
law," 5 now face dramatically increased exposure due to the threat of
criminal charges. These new criminal penalties seriously impinge
upon the relationship between indigent parents and their children.'
1 6
As a result of the increased burden placed on these parents, parents
with "bad" children may be more likely to surrender them to the state
- that is, to sever ties with their children rather than risk a criminal
penalty. 1 7 Parents who are having difficulty controlling their children
may be more willing to give them up, rather than keep them and po-
tentially risk their own liberty. 18
2. , The state's compelling interest
Once it has been determined that the Amendment infringes on
parental rights, the state has the burden of proving a compelling inter-
est that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve." 9 According to the
legislative findings of the STEP Act, the Amendment is designed to
further the goal of deterring gang activity. 2 The legislature's findings
state that
the State of California is in a state of crisis which has been
caused by violent street gangs whose members threaten, ter-
rorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the peaceful
citizens of their neighborhoods. These activities.., present
a clear and present danger to public order.1
21
This interest may very well be seen as compelling, 22 since there is
115. Due to their inability to pay damages, "[i]ndigent defendant[s] [are] already judg-
ment proof." Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1393, 1458 (1993); see John F. Vargo, The American Rule on
Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567,
1633 (1993).
116. "Contributing-to-delinquency statutes, in attempting to punish parents for the be-
havior of their youngsters, may placate public indignation, but they also are likely to fur-
ther disturb an already fractured family relationship." ARNOLD BINDER Er AL., JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, LEGAL PERSPECIVES 451 (1988).
117. Id. (stating that "[t]he possibility of punishment may also inhibit parental participa-
tion in juvenile court hearings and plans.")
118. See id.
119. See supra part IV.B.
120. CAL LEGIS. COUNSEL DIGEST, Ch. 1256, SB 1555, § 1, 186.21, at 3-4 (1988).
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West Supp. 1994).
122. However, even if California's alleged interest is a compelling one, this alone is not
sufficient-the state must establish that the alleged objective is the actualpurpose underly-
ing the statute. In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), a mere
intermediate scrutiny case, the United States Supreme Court held the state of Mississippi
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little disagreement that gang violence in urban areas, particularly in
Los Angeles, is a significant problem.'2
According to Los Angeles City Attorney James K. Hahn, the in-
terest of combating street gangs is not only important, but also vital,
due to "the role they play in destroying the family unit."124 Former
Los Angeles District Attorney, Ira Reiner, also emphasized the im-
portance of deterring gang activity, stating that
where the parent is not exercising responsibility, they play a
major role in what's going to happen to that kid, that 10-
year-old kid who's only a "want-to-be," he wants to be a
gangbanger. By the time he's 16 years old, he's out on the
street shooting and killing. Something needs to be done
when he's at an age that he can be controlled. The parent
has to exercise some responsibilities.125
However, even if the state is able to prove a compelling interest, it
must also show that the statute is "narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake.
126
3. The state's statute is not narrowly tailored to the compelling
interest of deterring gang activity
After it has been established that gang activity is a compelling
interest, the state still must show that it has chosen the least burden-
some means to effectuate this purpose.1 27 Therefore, to satisfy due
process requirements the state must demonstrate that the statute is
to its actual purpose of gender discrimination. The Court stated that "although the State
recited a 'benign, compensatory purpose,' it failed to establish that the alleged objective is
the actual purpose underlying the discriminatory classification." Id. at 730; see Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969). For
example, if a court were to find that California's actual intent was not to eliminate gang
activity but to target minorities, the statute would fail the first part of the due process test
and the statute would be invalidated. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388-89.
123. According to the District Attorney's Office, there are nearly 1,000 gangs in Los
Angeles County with approximately 150,000 members. L.A. Coumy DismTRicr AT-rOR-
NEY, GANGS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN Los ANGELES: FINDINGS AND PROPOSALS FROM
TH DisTRicr ArrORNEY'S OFFcE iv (May 1992) [hereinafter D.A. FNDINrs AND PRO-
POSALs]. "Gang homicides hit a record high of 771 in 1991-approximately 8.5 gang homi-
cides per 100,000 residents. That compares to five killings per 100,000 residents in 1980,
the peak of the worst previous cycle of gang violence." Id at ii.
124. Claire Cooper, 'Gang mon' law is upheld. Ruling OKs prosecution of parents, SAN
DiEGo UNioN-TRhB., July 2, 1993, at Al.
125. Nightline: Parent Arrested Under New L.A. Law (ABC television broadcast, May
2, 1989) (transcript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter
Nightline].
126. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
127. Id.
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the least burdensome way to achieve the goal of curbing gang vio-
lence, and that other less intrusive means would not achieve the goal
equally as well.1 28 However, the fact is, there are many less burden-
some alternatives to the Amendment.
The most obvious alternative is the STEP Act itself. Instead of
immediately enacting the Amendment as part of a package of anti-
gang measures,'129 the California Legislature could have implemented
the STEP Act first, to determine if it would adequately curb gang ac-
tivity.' 30 The STEP Act is clearly less burdensome on parental rights
since it is aimed at gangs themselves rather than at gang members'
families.' If the Legislature were to find that gang violence did not
decrease after implementing the STEP Act for a number of years,
then enactment of the Amendment might have been appropriate.
A second alternative to the Amendment is the already existing
parental diversion program. 32 A parent who has been arrested for
violation of the Amendment may be offered the opportunity to avoid
criminal charges through participation in the diversion program.3
"Many commentators believe that these parents need society's help,
not its punishment. ' 134 By offering parents the opportunity to im-
prove their parenting skills, the state would be providing a productive
and educational way for parents to learn to exercise control and su-
pervision over their delinquent children, rather than punishing parents
who may not have the skills necessary to raise their children. 35 The
state could also implement mandatory family counseling as a more
128. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
129. See supra part II.A.
130. There are already provisions within the STEP Act which include the very same
criminal activities covered by § 602. These provisions include §§ 186.22(b)(1) and
186.22(c) of the STEP Act, providing sentence enhancements for persons who commit
crimes "for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street
gang." CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West Supp. 1993).
131. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
132. See supra part II.A.
133. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
134. Parsley, supra note 87, at 469.
135. In a highly publicized case, Gloria Williams, a South Central Los Angeles woman,
was arrested under the "gang mom" law for failing to control her teenage son, who was
found guilty of participating in the four-day gang rape of a twelve year old girl. Philip
Hager, Justices to Review Parental Responsibility Law, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1992, at A24.
Although police found photos of Ms. Williams posing with members of the Crips-a Los
Angeles street gang whose name derives from the word "cripple"-and graffiti on bed-
room walls of her home, the City Attorney's Office dropped the charges when it learned
that Ms. Williams had completed a parenting course. Cooper, supra note 124, at A23. The
City Attorney apparently dropped the charges because he realized that under the circum-
stances, criminal punishment would serve no purpose.
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constructive option than fines, eviction, or imprisonment. 136
If the state is determined to punish parents of gang members for
bad parenting, the prosecutor may bring charges against a parent for
accomplice liability. 37 In this way, the state will not only accomplish
the goal of holding parents responsible, but ,will also avoid the
problems incurred by contributing statutes.
Another alternative is the utilization of other preexisting penal
code provisions. Even though other penal statutes are not specifically
targeted at gangs, a prosecutor may still bring charges against a gang
member for violations of the penal code. 38 There is nothing in the
District Attorney's Findings and Proposals 39 to suggest that the goal
of "seek[ing] the eradication of criminal activity by street gangs by
focusing upon patterns of criminal gang activity and upon the organ-
ized nature of street gangs.. ."I" is attainable only by enactment of
the Amendment.' 4 '
As it is, because the state did not explore alternative measures to
the Amendment, it cannot carry the burden of showing that these al-
ternatives would not have been equally effective. 142 Moreover, be-
cause some of these alternatives are brand new-like the diversion
program-the state must test these alternatives before resorting to the
more drastic criminal penalty.143
Not only is the success of criminal parenting statutes questionable
as an effective measure, but it is also questionable as a necessary
one. 44 "[Commentators long have argued that criminalizing parental
behavior does not reduce juvenile crime. While state officials readily
136. Parents and Crime, CHUmsAsP, SCL MONITOR, May 10, -1989, at 20.
137. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 31, 659 (West 1988).-
138. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187-199 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (homicide); id.
§§ 203-206.1 (mayhem and torture); id. §§ 207-210 (kidnapping); id. §§ 211-215 (robbery
and cariacking); id. §§ 240-247 (assault and battery); id. §§ 261-266j (rape); id. §§ 450-
457.1 (arson); id. §§ 640-640.7 (graffiti); id. § 647 (disorderly conduct).
139. See supra note 123.
140. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West Supp. 1994).
141. In fact, the District Attorney has even recognized the possibility that use of the
Amendment may prove "impractical," in which case, "the threat of lesser prosecutions can
still be effective." D.A. FINDINGS AND PROPOSALS, supra note 123, at 202.
142. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In Croson, the
Court held that Richmond's minority set-aside program for construction contracts violated
the Equal Protection Clause. The program was not narrowly tailored, due in part to the
city's failure to consider using race-neutral means. Id. at 507; see also Attorney Gen. v.
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 909-10 (1986) (holding that New York's residency requirement
for veteran's credits failed because state interests -could have been met by other less bur-
densome means).
143. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-10.
144. See S. Randall Humm, Criminalizing Poor Parenting Skills as a Means to Contain
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have assumed that [contributing] statutes actually reduce delinquency
rates, the only empirical study in this area revealed that these sanc-
tions simply do not achieve the desired results.' 14 Parental behavior
is only one of many contributing factors in the delinquency of a
child," and therefore a statute that merely addresses one aspect of
the problem will not be effective in combating juvenile crime.147
[E]vidence exists that parental liability statutes may fail to
deter crime. A study by the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare in 1963 examined sixteen states that had
enacted civil parental liability statutes and compared the
crime rates in those states with those in the rest of the coun-
try. The study revealed that the rate of juvenile delinquency
in the sixteen states that had enacted parental liability stat-
utes was slightly higher during 1957-1962 than was the na-
tional average.
148
The application of contributing statutes can also have an adverse
effect on the family unit. 49 "In general, fines under these statutes are
too small to effect a change in the behavior of the parents, but often
reduce the already minimal resources available for parents to provide
for the family."' 5 In addition, parents of an uncontrollable child as-
sociated with a gang may actually be afraid to attempt to discipline
their child.'
This evidence clearly demonstrates that California would be un-
Violence by and Against Children, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1123, 1160-61 (1991); Parsley, supra
note 87, at 467-72; Weinstein, supra note 107, at 900-01.
145. Parsley, supra note 87, at 467 (footnote omitted).
146. BINDER, supra note 116, at 88-90; see generally Cyril Burt, The young delinquent:
multiple causation theory, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, THE FAMILY AND THE SOCIAL
GROUP 17 (John Barron Mays ed., 1972) (discussing numerous contributory factors in juve-
nile delinquency).
147. Parsley, supra note 87, at 468. The author describes the many causes of delinquent
behavior, including "social class, educational level, urbanization, living conditions, and so-
cial instability." Id. According to Carol Sobel, attorney for plaintiffs, "[e]veryone feels
frustration with the rising violence in our culture.... But it's unfair to blame poor parents
for something that is a failure of our society as a whole." Jennifer Warren, Law on Prose-
cuting Parents of Delinquents Is Upheld, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1993, at Al, A30.
148. Weinstein, supra note 107, at 878. "Former New York Governor Harriman sug-
gested that the statutes might 'lead to added strain in families where relationships are al-
ready tense and might even give to troublesome delinquents a weapon against their
parents which they would not hesitate to use.'" Id. (citing Alice B. Freer, Parental Libility
[sic]for Torts of Children, 53 Ky. LJ. 254,261 (1964) (quoting from Governor Harriman's
speech made prior to his vetoing New York parental civil liability statute)).
149. BINDER, supra note 116, at 451.
150. See Parsley, supra note 87, at 469.
151. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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able to meet its burden of proving that the Amendment is necessary
to achieve its purpose. 152 In fact, some studies show that parental con-
tributing statutes such as the Amendment are ineffective in or even
detrimental to efforts to eradicate juvenile delinquency. 53 Therefore,
the state must show that these studies are flawed and that the Amend-
ment is necessary to control gang activity.154 But "section 272 does
not meet the rigors of the [strict scrutiny test] because the means cho-
sen are not sufficiently tailored to fulfill only the compelling state
interest."'155
In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur56 the Supreme
Court applied strict scrutiny to a school regulation that required preg-
nant teachers to leave work at least four months prior to the expected
births of their children.'57 The Court held that although the state's
interest in "continuity of instruction is a significant and legitimate ed-
ucational goal,"' 58 there were other alternatives to achieve its goal
which would have been less burdensome on parental rights.159 Simi-
larly, the California Legislature has a compelling interest in eradicat-
ing gang activity. However, like the statute in LaFleur, the
Amendment is not narrowly tailored to achieve this goal, and should
thus be unconstitutional. Moreover, although other states have also
made use of criminal parental liability statutes,' 60 "[u]nfortunately,
many existing parental responsibility laws, including the California
statute, do not meet fundamental constitutional standards.'
161
It is extremely difficult to attack the gang problem in California
by arresting the parents of gang members. Parents are often unaware
of their children's activities or are unable to control them. Moreover,
it would be more effective for the California Legislature to focus on
gang activity itself-to get to the root of the problem-rather than to
attack it in a roundabout fashion. Parents are only one cause of the
152. California did not even attempt to meet this burden, as the state was not required
to prove that the Amendment is narrowly tailored to its purpose of deterring gang activity.
See supra part IV.A.2.
153. Weinstein, supra note 107, at 878; see Parsley, supra note 87, at 467.
154. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 510-11.
155. Weinstein, supra note 107, at 878.
156. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
157. Id. at 638.
158. Id. at 643.
159. Id.; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (involving Amish parents who
refused to comply with statute because of religious beliefs).
160. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-13(a) (1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 530.060(1)
(Michie 1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:41 (1994); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(2)
(McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1994).
161. Humm, supra note 144, at 1126.
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societal dilemma of juvenile delinquency, and putting them in jail will
neither eradicate nor lessen this problem.
C. Equal Protection Analysis
The Supreme Court has held that neither the state nor the federal
government shall "denyto any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.. 16 An equal protection challenge to a statute
that interferes with a fundamental right-like a substantive due pro-
cess challenge-will be subjected to strict scrutiny.163 The law will
"thus [be] held unconstitutional absent a compelling governmental
justification if [it] distribute[s] benefits or burdens in a manner incon-
sistent with fundamental rights."'6 The inequalities, which result from
governmental interference with the exercise of intimate personal
choices 65-in this case child rearing-are particularly injurious to the
citizens upon whom they impinge. 166 Therefore, laws which signifi-
cantly impact a fundamental right must meet the requirements of an
exacting and rigorous test.167
1., The state's compelling interest
As noted earlier, California has a compelling interest in eradicat-
ing gang activity. 6 ' Under strict scrutiny review, the state may not
assert a purpose other than its actual one so as to avoid revealing any
162. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; s.ee Jeffrey A. Barker, Comment, Professional-
Client Sex: Is Criminal Liability an Appropriate Means of Enforcing Professional Respon-
sibility?, 40 UCLA L. Rav. 1275, 1333 (1993).
163. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 638 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 11.7, at 367;
TRIBE, supra note 69, § 16-7, at 1454; Barker, supra note 162, at 1333-34.
164. TIaE, supra note 69, § 16-7 at 1454; see Martha C. Foley, Note, Hospitalization
Requirements for Second Trimester Abortions: For the Purpose of Health or Hindrance?,
71 GEO. LJ. 991, 996 (1983).
165. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
166. TRIBE, supra note 69, § 16-7 at 1454. The Zablocki Court implied that the level of
impingement for an equal protection analysis is lower than what is required for due pro-
cess. See Zabldcki, 434 U.S. at 387. Under equal protection, if the statute directly and
substantially interferes with a fundamental right, then strict scrutiny will be triggered. Id.
167. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
168. See supra part IV.B.2.
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discriminatory intent.169 In other words, the state is locked into its
stated purpose.170 In Bernal v. Fainter,'171 a Texas law denied aliens
the opportunity to become notaries public due to their inability to
"familiariz[e] themselves with Texas law."' 7 The Supreme Court held
that the state's alleged purpose was insufficient because "the State
fail[ed] to advance a factual showing that the unavailability of nota-
ries' testimony present[ed] a real, as opposed to a merely speculative
problem to the State."' 73 Therefore, for purposes of an equal protec-
tion analysis, it is critical to discern the exact purpose of the statute in
question by making a factual determination. 174
In the instant case, the California Legislature has made its intent
to eliminate gang violence unmistakably clear in the legislative find-
ings of the STEP Act. 75 District Attorney Ira Reiner sponsored the
amendment to section 272, and his statements on Crossfire and Night-
line also serve to establish the real purpose of the statute. 76 There-
fore, the state is locked into its stated intention of eliminating gang
violence. This is relevant in determining whether the state has em-
ployed the least discriminatory means to achieve its objective.
2. Section 272 is not the least discriminatory way for California to
eradicate gang activity in the state
In an equal protection analysis involving fundamental rights, the
method chosen by the state must be the least discriminatory way to
169. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. Under both due process and equal
protection analyses, the state is held to its actual purpose.
170. The state may not assert that its purpose is to eliminate truant and disobedient
behavior in general by holding all parents liable under § 272 in order to cure the overin-
clusivity of the statute. If this was, in fact, the legislative purpose, then the statute would
be perfectly tailored to its purpose and would satisfy the requirements of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
171. 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
172. Id. at 227.
173. Id. at 227-28 (emphasis added).
174. Id.; Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464,494-96 (1981) (Brennan, J., joined
by White and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,769 (1977) (stat-
ing that "the Equal Protection Clause requires more than the mere incantation of a proper
state purpose").
175. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
176. Reiner stated that "these... gangs are made up of nothing but just a pack of killers
.... Each and every one of them is a sociopathic killer. The Crips and the Bloods are
nothing but killers .... Frankly, I think it is very good policy to hold these kinds of parents
accountable." Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, May 9, 1989); Nightline, supra note
125.
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accomplish its goal. 77 The law must be narrowly tailored to effectu-
ate only its compelling interest174_it may be neither under-
inclusive 17 9 nor overinclusive' 80 in terms of its goal. The Amendment,
however, is not narrowly tailored, and as such, is fatally
overinclusive.' 8
The purpose behind the Amendment is to rid California of gang
activity. The statute, however, is aimed at all parents, broadly sweep-
ing within its parameters parents whose children are not gang mem-
bers.'8 These parents and their children are not the "mischief '"1 8 3
that the California Legislature is trying to eliminate, rather, the
"trait"' that the Legislature is concerned with is the parents of gang
members. "A law may be said to be over-inclusive when the legisla-
tive classification includes all persons who are similarly situated in
terms of the law plus an additional group of persons." 18 5
In the case of the Amendment, the additional group of persons
included by the statutory classification is the parents of non-gang
members. The law does not even make specific mention of "criminal
street gangs"'1 6 as the STEP Act does."aT The Amendment includes
the parents of children who are merely truant and disobedient under
section 601 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, even in situations
where no crime has been committed. 88 However, this is not the sub-
stance of gang activities that the Legislature purported to target
through the enactment of the Amendment. Hypothetically, even if a
177. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144
(1972).
178. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 451.
179. "Underinclusive classifications do not include all who are similarly situated with
respect to a rule, and thereby burden less than would be logical to achieve the intended
government end." TRIE, supra note 69, § 16-4, at 1447. In practice, however, laws are
rarely invalidated due to underinclusiveness. Id. at 1447 n.4.
180. Id. at 1449.
181. "[I]t could be said that less restrictive alternatives exist for overinclusive classifica-
tions." Id. at 1450 n.23.
182. Id. at 1450 ("Because overinclusive classifications by definition burden some who
are not similarly situated with respect to the purposes of a rule, they may of course be
challenged as denying equal protection."). Section 272 has, in fact, been labelled the "gang
mom law," even though gang parents are not the only parents who may be arrested under
the law. See Cooper, supra note 124, at Al.
183. See Joseph Ttsman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. RFv. 341 (1949), for a general discussion of classic equal protection theory.
184. Id.
185. NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 14.2, at 527.
186. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
187. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.20 (West Supp. 1994).
188. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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parent has been successful in keeping a child out of a gang, that parent
could still be held liable under the Amendment merely because the
child is habitually truant.189 The California Legislature could have
drawn the Amendment more narrowly by limiting sections 601 and
602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code strictly to gang-related activi-
ties. This further demonstrates that the Amendment is not necessary
to achieve its purpose of eliminating gang activity.
Zablocki v. Redhail'91 discusses the tightness of fit required in
equal protection fundamental rights cases. In Zablocki, the Supreme
Court struck down a Wisconsin law that prohibited any resident from
marrying without court permission if that person had minor children
not in his or her custody, and had failed to demonstrate: (1) proof of
compliance with the support obligation; and (2) that the children cov-
ered by the support order "are not then and are not likely thereafter
to become public charges."'191 The law impinged upon a fundamental
right-the right to marry-subjecting it to strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause.92 The Court found that the statutory classi-
fication was fatally' overinclusive.' 93 The purpose of the law was to
encourage parents of children not in their custody to pay child sup-
port. However, "[g]iven the possibility that the new spouse will actu-
ally better the applicant's financial situation, by contributing income
from a job or otherwise, the statute in many cases may prevent af-
fected individuals from improving their ability to satisfy their prior
support obligations."' 94
A statutory classification which unnecessarily impinges on a fun-
damental right cannot be sustained. 95 Because less discriminatory al-
ternatives would accomplish the goal of eradicating gang activity, the
Amendment is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme' Court's decision in Williams v.
189. Seesupra note 12 and accompanying text. Furthermore, truancy under § 601 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code does not include a gang-related activity, unless it is the sin-
gular case where a gang's oath states that the members will not go to school. See CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West 1984).
190. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
191. Id. at 375 (quoting Wis. STAT. § 245.10 (1973)).
192. Id. at 384.
193. IM at 390.
194. Id
195. Id. at 388.
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Garcetti96 determined that the amendment to section 272 is constitu-
tional by mistakenly utilizing a First Amendment analysis."9 The
court should have applied a due process' 98 or an equal protection
analysis, 99 in which case the law would have been found unconstitu-
tional. By applying the wrong analysis, the court has set a confusing
precedent as to the appropriate review a lower court should apply to
laws impinging on fundamental rights. However, this decision does
not state, and should not be interpreted to mean, that a future chal-
lenge to the Amendment-brought on due process or equal protec-
tion grounds-would not succeed.
The Amendment will not accomplish its goal of eradicating gang
activity because parental liability statutes do not deter juvenile delin-
quency.2°° State legislatures should recognize that many factors con-
tribute to a child's delinquency2 0 -not just poor parenting. Families
with delinquent children need counseling and therapy in order to re-
solve the problems that disrupt their lives-not punishment. The dif-
ficulties they face are so complex and numerous that it is nearly
impossible to specify the precise ingredients that contribute to a
child's delinquency. We must attack the gang problem head on, with-
out letting ourselves be sidetracked by any single contributing factor.
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196. 5 Cal. 4th 561, 853 P.2d 507, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341 (1993).
197. See supra part IV.A.
198. See supra part IV.B.
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200. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
* This Note is dedicated to my parents, Edyie and Bob Ligorsky, to my sisters,
Brenda and Debbie, and to Chris, for all of their love and support. I would like to extend
my warmest appreciation and thanks to Professor Christopher May of Loyola Law School
for his generous help and insightful comments. Thanks also to the editors and staff of the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for all of their hard work.
[Vol. 28:447
